The Financial Lobby and Impact of Other Stakeholders in the EU: A good model for emancipation of the financial system in Kosovo

Abstract

Lobbying is a phenomenon which is already present in all political systems and it is not surprising if 
you consider the issue of lobbying within the formal structures of governance of financial markets and financial 
industry in the EU and Kosovo. However, the complex and inscrutable institutional structures in 
EU inevitably result in an inevitable quality of lobbying, which give more influence to the stakeholders that have 
the resources to organize and develop systematic lobbying activities.   
This 
paper describes how lobbying of influential institutions groups in EU, involved in decision 
making about financial services and markets, occurs through official channels, such as public consultations, and 
through informal means, such as close meetings between lobbyists and decision makers or officials within EU 
institutions. In this context we intend to rationalize such a behavior pattern in the regulation of the financial 
system in Kosovo.  
Kosovo has some fundamental problems in the field of regulation of the financial system and financial industry in 
conformity with the rules of functioning of the market economies. Instead of formal and official 
conversation between 
interest 
groups about the regulation 
of financial 
system, 
frequently are 
used corrupt models of influence which later are classified as criminal, and often classified as organized 
crime activities. From this point of view lobbying should be considered as a reasonable option within the formal 
structures of governance of financial markets and financial industry in Kosovo.